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ing a subsidiary has the ultimate effect of closing that employer's doors to
every person with whom he has any business and is thus an implied agree-
ment "to cease doing business with any other person." The fact that an
agreement is couched in terms restrictive of the contracting employer's own
business would seem to be of little import if the practical effect of such a
clause is to cause him to cease doing business with every other person for
whom he performs or exchanges services or obtains supplies. Thus proponents
of this line of argument could contend that neutral employers and employees
are drawn into the economic conflict. This result is precisely what 8(e)
seeks to prevent.
The argument based on the practical effect of the chain shop clause ap-
pears to be the most cogent reason for holding such a clause violative of
8(e), It is submitted that on this basis chain shop clauses should be held
unlawful. However, it should be noted that the single employer exception
can always save a chain shop clause from illegality. It may be maintained
that this exception should be determined by the same criteria applicable to
8(b) (4) (A), which is also directed at secondary boycott activity." This
view would restrict the utilization of chain shop clauses to situations where
there is substantial indicia of control.
It seems apparent from the respective postures of the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits that the courts may come to differ greatly in construing and apply-
ing section 8(e). While the two circuits are in accord on the illegality of the
trade shop clause and could concur on the legal propriety of a carefully
constructed struck work clause, they are poles apart in their treatment of the
chain shop clause. This latter impasse in "the process of litigating elucida-
tion" may remain until resolved by the Supreme Court.
JOHN P. KANE
Labor Law—Section 301—The Standing of an Employee to Sue—Con-
tract Breach Amounting to an Unfair Labor Practice.—Smith v. Eve-
ning News Ass'n. 1—The petitioner sued in his individual capacity and as
assignee of the action of forty others for damages for breach of a collective
bargaining contract by his employer, Evening News Association. While the
respondent was being struck by a union of which the petitioner is not a
member, he and other non-striking union employees were refused entrance to
the working premises by the respondent. Non-union workers were allowed
to be at their job even though the newspaper was completely inoperative.
These employees were given full wages while the petitioner was not. Smith
sued for the withheld wages as damages for breach of the non-discrimination
clause of the contract in the Michigan state court. The action was dismissed
on the rationale that a suit by an individual to enforce a contract involving
an unfair labor practice was pre-empted by the National Labor Relations
17 Truck Driver's, Local 728 v. Empire State Express, 293 F.2d 414 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961) ; Bachman Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 599 (8th Cir.
1959) ; J. G. Roy & Sons v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1958).
1 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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Board.2 HELD: Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Ace
gives the courts, both state and federal, jurisdiction to enforce collective bar-
gaining contracts. Although there arguably may be elements of unfair labor
practices present, such does not necessitate the surrender of jurisdiction by
the courts to the NLRB. The same policy considerations that have bestowed
this concurrent jurisdiction on the courts apply whether the contract rights
are those of management, of union or of an individual employee.
The Court strongly reaffirms the relative sweep of section 301 against
the pre-emption doctrine. It does not seem to matter what labor policy
factors might be running in the contract suit; notwithstanding the traditional
jurisdiction of the Board to hear these facts, a court may entertain the suit
and decide whatever labor policy questions are relevant. The Court does
hedge somewhat when it acknowledges, without specifying, possible restric-
tions to hearing these actions.
If, as respondent strongly urges, there are situations in which
serious problems will arise from both the courts and the Board
having jurisdiction over acts which amount to an unfair labor prac-
tice, we shall face those cases when they arise. 4
The real impact of the decision on the scope of section 301 centers on
the inclusion within the section of an individual's suit to enforce an em-
ployee's contract rights .° Unless the petitioner was within the scope of sec-
tion 301, his suit would be no more than a common law action, and as it in-
volves a violation of either Sections 7 or 8 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, it must be within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB.°
Crucial to the handling of this case is the manner in which the pre-
emption doctrine is constricted by the Court. The high water mark for pre-
emption was the decision in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 7
wherein the Supreme Court refused to allow a state court's award of damages
as a result of a boycott strike even though the NLRB declined to exercise
jurisdiction. The reasoning was that the Board was vested with exclusive
primary jurisdiction and its failure to exercise this jurisdiction did not grant
it to the states.° The motive that exists behind the Garmon pre-emption doc-
2 362 Mich. 350, 106 N.W.2d 785 (1961).
3 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affect commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
4 371 U.S. at 197-98.
5 "Neither the language and structure of § 301 nor its legislative history requires or
persuasively supports this restrictive interpretation . • .." Id. at 200.
6 This pre-emption doctrine was the starting point for the Michigan Supreme Court:
"It seems we must start with the general premise that Congress has pre-empted the field
in labor relations matters affecting interstate commerce and has vested exclusive juris-
diction in the National Labor Relations Board to determine such labor disputes .. . ."
Supra note 2, at 355, 106 N,W,2d at 787.
359 U.S. 236 (1959).
8 "Since the National Labor Relations Board has not adjudicated the status of the
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trine is the necessity for uniformity in the formulation and application of a
national labor policy.° The significance of labor-management harmony in in-
dustrial life is axiomatic. Such harmony, Garmon would say, is best regulated
at the national level." It can be added immediately that this approach is
not altogether watertight. Examples of actual conflict with the NLRB are
nearly impossible to discover. 11
 Moreover, there are peculiar forms of unfair
labor practices over which Section 303 of the LMRA gives the courts juris-
diction to bear." Finally, pre-emption seems to surround the NLRB with an
air of perfection, a conclusion which the Labor Bar would be, at least, willing
to dispute."
The major clash with the pre-emption doctrine is embodied in the instant
case. Section 301 confers on the courts jurisdiction to hear breach of col-
lective bargaining contract actions without apparent regard for the circum-
stance in which the breach may occur. 14
Implicit in the enforcement of the contract is the possibility of first
adjudicating an unfair labor practice. The Court in Evening News considers
such an objection to be immaterial and will ignore pre-emption even ". . .
where the alleged conduct of the employer, not only arguably, but concededly,
is an unfair labor practice."' Despite the presence of a possible disruption of
a uniform national labor policy, a party may avoid pre-emption by charac-
terizing his suit as a contract violation." The Court seems to resolve this
possible conflict by holding that the courts do not interfere with the Board's
conduct for which the State of California seeks to give remedy . . . and since such
activity is arguably within the compass of § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the State's jurisdiction
is displaced." Id. at 246. This portion of Garman was supplanted by the Landrum-
Griffin Act which gave the states the right to hear these actions when the Board declines
to do so. 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (1961 Supp.).
o As summarized in Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB,
76 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 546 (1963):
(a) The opportunities for misapplication of the LMRA are considerable since
factfinding errors as well as mistakes in the interpretation of legal principles
can find their way into court decisions.
(b) If courts can't decide LMRA cases, they can't conflict with NLRB deci-
sions.
(c) Settlement would be inhibited by alternate tribunals.
10
 "To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of
federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict • . •" San Diego Union v.
Garmon, supra note 7, at 244.
11 Sovern, supra note 9, at 571.
12
 I.e., hot-cargo agreements, secondary boycotts and work assignment disputes—
practices which violated section 8(b) (4). 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (1958),
as amended by 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1962 Supp.).
13
 The Labor Relations section of the ABA narrowly defeated a proposed recom-
mendation to take away from the NLRB jurisdiction of unfair labor practices. 48
L.R.R.M. 42 (1961).
14 "Where the parties have bargained for lawful contractual provisions and agreed
upon procedure for enforcement, it would promote the industrial peace • . . to give
effect to their arrangements." Brief for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae, p. 16.
15 371 U.S. at 197.
16 Respondent cites this as a tour de force and as a method of subverting the juris-
diction of the NLRB, Brief for Respondent, pp. 38, 40. On the other hand, the absence
of this method might allow parties to avoid court enforcement by characterizing a breach
as an unfair labor practice.
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ruling since their jurisdiction is co-extensive." Moreover, the NLRB itself
dismisses the shadow of dichotomy in labor law adjudication when the courts
are enforcing contracts. In collective bargaining contracts the adverse party
consideration should be sufficient to check any ". .. danger of upsetting the
federal statutory balance between the interest of labor and management.""
Hence, in the normal set of circumstances, the enforcement of contract rights
should involve little danger of interfering with national labor policy.
The decision in Evening News is crucial not only in the restraints added
to the pre-emption doctrine but, more importantly, for the substantial en-
hancement of section 301. It would almost seem that the Court has gone the
full route in the delineation of the section. Previously, it had been established
that state courts may hear section 301 violations," the only restraint being
that federal law be applied." Thus, a state action may be immune not only
from federal courts' pre-emption, but from the NLRB pre-emption doctrine
that was fatal in the Garmon case.
A noticeable gap in section 301 which had existed up to the instant case
was the enforcement of individual rights under a collective bargaining con-
tract within this section's jurisdiction. The outstanding case on the point,
and the one which was the most influential in the Michigan courts, was
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Corp.21
This case was brought by a union to enforce the right of employees to wages
which were due though they were absent from work as agreed upon in their
contract. The suit was dismissed because of the absence within 301(a), the
Court believed, of any provision to enforce individuals' rights under federal
law.22
 This decision was largely the product of constitutional worries which
the Court had if it were to expand the scope of section 301 to cover this
SUlt.23
Derived from this holding came a swarm of lower court decisions which
dismissed suits by individuals against employers under section 301. 24 The
immunity of individuals from section 301 suits did not follow as might be ex-
pected. But, inasmuch as employees were made parties to these actions, the
suits did forecast the result in Smith v. Evening News. 25
17
 371 U.S. at 197.
IS Brief for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae, p. 14.
19
 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
20
 Teamsters, Local 174 v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
21 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
22 Id. at 461.
23 From this conclusion inevitably emerge questions regarding the constitution-
ality of a grant of jurisdiction to federal courts over a contract governed en-
tirely by state substantive law, a jurisdiction not based on diversity of citizen-
ship yet one in which a federal court would, as in diversity cases, administer the
law of the state in which it sits.
Id, at 449.
24 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1959)
(employees' personal rights cannot be enforced) ; Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107 (1st Cir,
1956) (§ 301 means both "suits" and "contracts" between only union and management) ;
United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motors Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1952)
(individuals may join a union suit only if there is a diversity of citizenship) ; Dimeco v.
Fisher, 185 F. Supp. 213 (D. N.J. 1960) (wrongful discharge is common law action,
not § 301).
25 371 U.S. at 199.
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The constitutional doubts raised'in Westinghouse were swept away and
section 301 was cast in much expanded terms in the leading case of Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills. 26 This action was brought to gain specific
performance of an arbitration award to employees. The union brought the
suit in its own right as an enforcement of the arbitration provision of its
contract. In granting the relief, the Supreme Court construed section 301 as
creating a substantial body of federal common law for labor relations." The
Court could find no constitutional obstruction to reaching this decision."
Finding the body of law which section 301 creates to include suits
brought by individual employees seems to follow logically from the Lincoln
Mills decision. The only noticeable movement involved in reaching the
Evening News decision is the reading of section 301 to include not only suits
between union and management, but also suits between all parties to the
collective bargaining contract."
While it may now seem that section 301 has come full circle in its sweep
of power, there remains left over from the legions of varied interpretations
fertile areas for distinction and avoidance of the holding in this case. The
Court itself gives a clue to this possibility in a footnote which states that the
Court is not deciding that the petitioner's suit by reason of the nature of the
breach is within section 301.3° The opinion then, not applicable to all of the
facts of the case, takes on the aura of an advisory decision. This departure
from accepted Supreme Court procedure formulated a primary basis for Mr.
Justice Black's Ione dissent.
The significance of this peculiar manner of deciding a case may indeed be
seen in its affect upon future employee suits. For, while the Court appears to
have gone the full course in opening up 301, Mr. Justice White clearly holds
back from deciding that these employees in this discrimination suit have
standing to sue. One immediately wonders why there would not be standing.
The one clear result of this decision is that Westinghouse will no longer
control these suits. Individual employee's rights can be sued upon in damages
(Evening News), as well as protected by injunction (Lincoln Mills). The
only remaining aspect is the question as to which breaches of contract are
enforceable by an employee. As stated before, Evening News talks in terms
of employee suits having standing, but when applied to this discrimination
suit, the Court stops short. The answer to this inconsistency may lie in the
preservation of a distinction that arose in Westinghouse: contract clauses
promissory to unions, and clauses promissory to employees, 31- which distinction
26 353 U.S. 448 (1957) .
27
 Id. at 451.
28 "There is no constitutional difficulty. Article III, § 2 extends the judicial power to
cases 'arising under the laws of the United States • • .' The power of Congress to regu-
late these labor-management controversies under the Commerce Clause is plain." Id. at
457.
20 See note 5 supra.
371 U.S. at 201 n.9.
31 "[T]here is set out no violation of a contract between an employer and a labor
organization as is required to confer jurisdiction under 301. The facts show an al-




also found its way into the Lincoln Mills decision.32 Thus, while a clause in
a collective bargaining contract, such as this discrimination clause, seems to
benefit employees, its primary effect is upon the union's position vis-à-vis
management. It is perfectly conceivable that Smith's suit on remand may be
again dismissed. This time, rather than giving pre-emption as the grounds,
the Court would find that the clause may properly only be sued upon by the
union.
In view of these sub-surface distinctions that obstruct actions before
the courts, a suit before the Board would appear to be the course of least
resistance. This should have been all the more compelling for Smith and the
other petitioners inasmuch as the NLRB has procedural apparatus prepared
for just this type of claim.33
This raises the question of the relative desirability of resorting to one
of the two systems: the courts or the Board. The NLRB has procedural
disadvantages in two respects: the statute of limitations and the adminis-
trative labyrinth. The reason the Evening News Association urged pre-
emption of the petitioner's suit was that by the time the action was brought,
the six months statute of limitations had run.24 Additionally, the procedural
obstructions to the quick remedy desired produce a delay which can make
the Board financially unappetizing, especially to a worker a5
On the other hand, the enforcement of contracts in court would expose
one to the perils involved with contract law:3° These perils need not apply
where the action brought to the NLRB is based upon an unfair labor practice.
Along the same line, the employee's ability to enforce his rights can be
divorced from a contract in the nature of a "sweetheart agreement."37 His
union's cooperation may not be so crucial, especially if he represents a
minority voice within the organization.
In determining the advisability of recourse to the Board or to the courts
to enforce a contract, where any injunctive relief is sought, the provisions of
Norris-LaGuardia would put employees in a more favorable position than
employers. Despite the classification of the action as specific performance of
a no-strike clause rather than as an unfair labor practice, the court would
32 "There fin Westinghouse] the union sued to recover unpaid wages on behalf of
. .. employees. . . . The question here concerns the right of the union to enforce the
agreement ... which it has made with the employer." Supra note 26, at 456 n.6.
33
 The Board has a specific procedure to award back wages when there has been
discrimination affecting an employee's wages. Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator, 90 N.L.R.B.
320, 26 L.R.R.M. 1189 (1950).
34 371 U.S. at 197 n.5.
35
 The Board's procedure and effect on claimants have been described as a ". . . slow
and creaking procedure which like a wounded snake, has dragged its slow length along,
sans bargaining, sans labor peace, sans everything, but pride of opinion, ill temper and
frustration." International Ass'n of Machinists v, Cameron Iron Workers, Inc., 257 F.2d
467, 474 (5th Cir. 1958).
36 Contract was not enforced since it was oral and violated parol evidence rule.
Hamilton Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Molders & Foundry Workers, 95 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.
Ohio 1951).
37 A contract which does not properly protect an employee's rights may be dis-
regarded by the courts as such a contract is before the NLRB for containing illegal union
security provisions. Sovern, supra note 9, at 571.
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have no injunctive power,38
 whereas the Board would. 38 As this limitation
does not extend to actions against employers," the employee would have
free access to the courts.
A further implication of the case might be that the individual employee
would have standing, under section 301, to sue the union for breach of the
contract. In deciding whether to classify his complaint as a contract viola-
tion or an unfair labor practice, the complainant would consider the tradi-
tional judicial requirement of exhaustion of internal remedies, 4 ' which is not
required in complaints to the Board." In such a suit it would seem that any
injunctive jurisdiction of the court would not be beyond the reach of in-
dividual employees against the union, as such actions by individuals would
not be "a part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was aimed." 43
Nevertheless, while there may be decided exceptions to the desirability
of employees using the courts to bring suit against an employer, they are just
that—exceptions. There can be little doubt that this new weapon of em-
ployees, and thereby of unions, against management shall be utilized in the
enhancing of their bargaining position. What is definitely still in doubt is
whether and where the courts will mark off the access of employees to sec-
tion 301. The use of Evening News to answer this is limited.
PAUL E. D'HEDOUVILLE
Negotiable Instruments—Due Date of Note—Effect of Acceleration
Clause in Mortgage.—Poultrymen's Service Corp. v. Brown. 1—A promis-
sory note payable to the order of the plaintiff 120 months after date was
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
RO 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
40 Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. B. & 0. R.R., 310 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1962).
41 See Parks v. IBEW, 52 L.R.R.M. 2281, 2311 (4th Cir. 1963) and Detroy v.
American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 77-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
929 (1961) holding that Section 101(a) (4) of the Landrum-Griffin Act:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an
action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irre-
spective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as
defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the right of any mem-
ber of a labor organization to appear as a witness in any judicial, administrative,
or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate with
any legislator: Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust
reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time)
within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings
against such organizations or any officer thereof: And provided further, That no
interested employer or employer association shall directly or indirectly finance,
encourage, or participate in, except as a party, any such action, proceeding, ap-
pearance, or petition.
limits the jurisdiction of the court. Compare Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 306
F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962), holding that the four months proviso was directed only to the
unions. In view of the legislative history indicating an intent to retain judicial discre-
tion, and those decisions using the rationale of Detroy to establish an absolute right to
sue after four months, the Sheridan approach seems the better interpretation. See 105
Cong. Rec. 16414 (1959).
42 LMRA § 10(i), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1958).
43 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 26.
1 77 N.J. Super. 198, 185 A.2d 706 (Ocean County Ct. 1962),
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